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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEON SPROUSE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 890642-CA

vs.
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA
H. JAGER, ARTIE
EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS,
and JOHN DOES 1 through
V,
Defendants.
ROY N. LARSEN, ARTIE
EDMUNDS, and INTERWEST
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
LEON SPROUSE,
Third-Party
Defendant-Appellant.
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the
Court in a civil case following a bench trial.

The Utah Supreme

Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j)
(Supp. 1989).

The Supreme Court transferred this case to the

Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp.
1989) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is a modification

of the payment

terms of a real

estate commission required by the statute of frauds to be in
writing and signed by the real estate broker?
2.

Did the evidence establish as a matter of law that

Edmunds consented to and accepted the modification of a contract
for payment

of a real estate commission

and was the trial

court's finding, that Edmunds did not consent to the modification , contrary to the great weight of the evidence?
3.
interest,

May a party selectively claim the benefits of lien,
and

attorney

fee

provisions

of

a

contract

while

repudiating other integral portions of the same contract?
4.

Did the trial court err in awarding Edmunds-all of his

attorney fees incurred in this litigation where most of the fees
were not related to the point on which plaintiff prevailed?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989) , as in effect at the times
in issue, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
In the following cases, every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:

(5)
Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation.
Section 25-5-4 was amended

in 1989 effective April 24,

2

1989,

but

no

provisions.

substantive

changes

were

made

in

the

quoted

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case.
This is a civil case to recover a real estate commission.

The case arises out of the sale of a motel in St. George, Utah.
Numerous other claims were asserted among the parties but are
not relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
Leon Sprouse commenced this action on September 10, 1986,

by

filing a complaint

forfeiture of Jager's

against Arjen W. Jager to declare a
interest, under a Uniform Real Estate

Contract, in the motel which Jager had purchased from Sprouse.
(R. vol. I, pp. 1-7.)

Artie Edmunds, although not then a party

to the action, filed an affidavit claiming an interest in the
property.

(R. vol. I, p. 47.)

Sprouse ultimately amended his

complaint to seek judicial foreclosure of all interests inferior
to his vendor's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and named Artie Edmunds and others as additional defendants.
(R. vol. I, pp. 93-103.)

Arjen Jager asserted a counterclaim

against

that

Sprouse

alleging

Sprouse

made

fraudulent

mis-

representations to induce Jager to purchase the motel, and filed
a cross-claim against Artie Edmunds making essentially the same
allegations.

(R. vol. I, pp. 107-20.)

Edmunds filed a counter-

claim against Sprouse for a declaration that he had a lien on
3

the motel pursuant to a "Note/Agreement/Assignment" and alleged
that his lien should be paid first from the proceeds of any
foreclosure

sale,

and

also

foreclosure of that lien.

cross-claimed

against

Jager

for

(R. vol. I, pp. 126-34.)

A judgment and decree of foreclosure was ultimately entered
against the defendants.

(R. vol. II, pp. 96-99, 190.)

The

property was sold at a sheriff's sale on December 10, 1987, and
the property was sold to Leon Sprouse
$360,000.00.

(R. vol. II, pp. 102-03.)

for a credit bid of
The remaining claims by

and against Jager were subsequently dismissed by stipulation of
the parties.

(R. vol. II, pp. 194-95.)

On October 22, 1987, which was subsequent to the hearing
which resulted in the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, but
prior to the entry
Edmunds,

and

plaintiffs,

of that Judgment,

Interwest
filed

a

Commercial

"Third-Party

Roy N. Larsen, Artie

Properties, as third-party
Complaint

in

against Leon Sprouse, as third-party defendant.
pp. 83-90.)

(R. vol. II,

The Third-Party Complaint in Intervention sought

recovery of a real estate commission
counterclaimed

Intervention"

asserting

from Sprouse.

that the third-party

Sprouse

plaintiffs had

misrepresented Jager's financial ability and sought dismissal of
the claim for a commission and judgment for damages.
II, pp. 111-20.)
Complaint

(R. vol.

The case proceeded to trial on the Third-Party

in Intervention

and Sprouse's

4

counterclaim

in the

third-party action.1
favor

of

the

The court after trial found the issues in

third-party

plaintiffs

and

entered

Reinstated

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reinstated Judgment
on July 12, 1989.2

(R. vol. II, pp. 147-53, 154-55.)

Sprouse filed his Notice of Appeal on August 10, 1989.
vol. Ill, pp. 194-95.)

(R.

At the time the Notice of Appeal was

filed, Sprouse had pending a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
for relief from the "Order Reinstating Original Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Original Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.11
(R. vol. Ill, pp. 162-65.)

The motion was denied by Order

entered on September 1, 1989.

(R. vol. Ill, pp. 201-02.)

C.

Statement Of Facts,
This action arises out of the sale of the Oasis Motel in

St. George, Utah.

Leon Sprouse, the owner of the motel, had

1

Sprouse is unaware of any order which formally dismissed
Sprouse!s initial complaint against Edmunds or Edmunds' counterclaim against Sprouse.
2

The convoluted procedural history which led to the entry
of "reinstated11 findings, conclusions and judgment is not
relevant to the issues raised on appeal and is not set forth in
detail. Briefly stated, Edmunds submitted proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and a judgment, and Sprouse objected
to the form of the proposals. The proposals were nevertheless
inadvertently signed by the court, but not entered, and were
subsequently vacated by minute entry. The court then initially
sustained Sprouse's objections to the proposed findings and
conclusions and directed Edmunds to prepare a new proposal.
Edmunds thereafter asserted that Sprouse's initial objection had
been untimely and requested that the initial findings of fact
and conclusions of law and judgment be reinstated.
Sprousefs
counsel inadvertently failed to appear at the hearing on the
motion for reinstatement, and the motion was granted. Sprouse
thereafter moved to vacate the reinstated findings and judgment.
The court denied the motion to vacate.
5

signed a listing agreement with Interwest Commercial Properties,
but it had expired on October 12, 1984.

(Exhibit No. 1.)

In

February, 1985, Artie Edmunds, a real estate sales agent for
Interwest Commercial Properties (Tr. 77) , contacted Sprouse to
inquire whether he would be interested in selling the motel to a
potential purchaser whom Edmunds had located.

(Tr. 84, 165.)

No listing agreement was in force at that time.

The prospective

purchaser, Arjen Jager, had no cash and offered other properties
in trade for the down payment.

(Tr. 167.)

An Earnest Money

Sales Agreement was ultimately signed between Arjen Jager and
Leon Sprouse on March 11, 1985.

(Exhibit No. 2, copy attached

in Appendix C.)
The Earnest

Money

Sales Agreement

included

a- provision

signed by Sprouse wherein Sprouse agreed to pay "Artie EdmundsInterwest

Commercial

commission.

Properties"

a

$25,000.00

real

estate

Sprouse testified that Edmunds had agreed, prior to

Sprouse signing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, that payment
of

the

commission

was

contingent

on

Jager

performing

his

obligations under the contract, and agreed to include a provision to that effect in the final closing documents.
78.)

(Tr. 177-

Edmunds disputed that testimony. (Tr. 118.)
The transaction closed on Friday, March 29, 1985.

The

closing documents were prepared by James Ivins, an attorney and
owner of Meridian Title Company.

(Tr. 211.)

The Earnest Money

Sales Agreement was replaced by a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(Exhibit No. 3.)

Ivins also prepared a "Note/Agreement/Assign-

6

ment" to

set

commission.

forth

the

obligation

to pay

the

It is this Note/Agreement/Assignment

real

estate

(hereinafter

"NAA") which was the primary focus of the controversy in this
action.
Mr.

Ivins

testified

that

his

instructions

on what

to

prepare for the closing regarding the real estate commission
came only from Mr. Edmunds.

(Tr. 215.)

He testified that the

instructions came both by telephone call (Id.) and by a note
mailed to him by Mr. Edmunds.

(Tr. 236, 243, Exhibit No. 24.)

Ivins specifically testified that Edmunds instructed Ivins that
Sprouse was to have no personal liability for the real estate
commission if Jager defaulted.

(Tr. 213-14, 245-47.)

Edmunds

acknowledged giving instructions to Ivins that payment of the
commission was to be deferred and paid over 48 months (Tr. 104),
and acknowledged that he had sent a note (Exhibit 24) to Mr.
Ivins concerning the commission.
denied making

any

statements

(Tr. 256, 1. 21-22.)

to Ivins

Edmunds

regarding what would

happen on the real estate commission if Jager defaulted in his
payments (Tr. 105), and specifically denied that he had agreed
that Sprouse would not be personally liable for the real estate
commission.

(Tr. 118.)

The NAA was signed by Leon Sprouse with the other documents
at the closing.
Sprouse.

(Tr. 117, 176, 217.)

The NAA is signed only by

Ivins prepared the NAA for signature only by Sprouse

because promissory notes are usually signed only by the promisor

T

(Tr. 233), and because he was not aware of the statute of frauds
relating to real estate commission agreements. (Tr. 242.)
On the following Tuesday, April 2, 1985, Interwest Commercial Properties assigned the NAA to Edmunds.
16.)

(Tr. 121, Exhibit

On April 24, 1985, Edmunds assigned the NAA to Draper Bank

& Trust as security for a loan.

(Tr. 123, Exhibit 17.)

He

reacquired the NAA on September 24, 1986, after this action was
commenced. (Tr. 124; Exhibit 19.)
Jager took possession of the motel on April 1, 1985.
48.)

(Tr.

He made his payments on the contract regularly until May,

1986.

(R. vol. I, p. 158.)

A portion of each of the payments

had been applied to the real estate commission, and the remaining principal balance of the $25,000.00 commission, at the time
Jager stopped making payments, was $19,226.80.

(Exhibit 21.)

Jager relinquished possession of the motel to Sprouse on June
28, 1987 (Tr. 50, 51, 61), and Sprouse purchased the motel at
the foreclosure sale.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court found that Sprouse did not carry his burden
of proof in proving that there had been a modification of the
agreement to pay a real estate commission which was initially
set forth in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.

The trial

courtfs finding was based in part on the legal conclusion that
any modification

of the payment

terms

for the

real

estate

commission was within the statute of frauds and required to be
signed by the broker.

The statute of frauds does not, however,
8

apply to modifications of the payment terms of a real estate
commission contract.

The statute of frauds requires only that

the contract of employment (the agreement to pay a commission)
be in writing.

Once the contract of employment is in writing,

the parties may modify the payment provisions of that contract
by parol.

Where the trial court's factual finding was based on

an erroneous assumption of law, the case must be remanded for a
new trial.
The trial court's finding, that Sprouse failed to carry his
burden of proof of showing that the real estate

commission

agreement was modified, was also contrary to the great weight of
the evidence.

Every witness with personal knowledge of the

facts, except for Edmunds, testified that Edmunds 'had agreed
that Sprouse would not be personally liable for the commission.
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Edmunds
treated the NAA as being the sole document which governed the
real estate commission obligation.
assignment

of the NAA

This is reflected

on the Tuesday

following

the

in an
Friday

closing, and continuing through the initial pleadings filed by
Edmunds in this action.

His self-serving denial of consent to

the NAA was contrary to the great weight of the evidence and the
court erred in failing to find that he had consented to the NAA.
Notwithstanding the trial court's conclusion that Sprouse
could not enforce the beneficial provisions of the NAA, the
trial court enforced those provisions of the NAA adverse to
Sprouse.

Piecemeal enforcement of a contract is not permis9

sible.

Either the entire contract was agreed to by the parties,

or no portion of it was.

The trial court's award of pre-

judgment interest at 12% per annum and the award of attorney
fees were both based on provisions of the NAA and must therefore
be vacated.
The award of attorney fees is, in any event, not supported
by the evidence.

Edmunds was entitled to recover attorney fees,

if at all, only with respect to the issues on which he prevailed.

The

testimony

showed

that

only

one-third

of

the

$9,000.00 attorney fees were incurred with respect to the issues
on which Edmunds prevailed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MODIFICATION OF THE REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION AGREEMENT WAS NOT WITHIN THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDSThe trial court's finding that "defendant has failed to
meet his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written
or oral modification of his obligation to pay a commission"
(Reinstated Findings of Fact, para. 8, R. vol. Ill, p. 149) was
based in part on the court's legal conclusion that any modification of the real estate agreement was required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing.
Ill, p. 152.)

(Conclusions of Law, para. 4, R. vol.

Review of this question of statutory construction

should be under a correctness standard with no deference given
to the trial court's ruling nor to the finding based thereon.
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989).
10

Sprouse acknowledges for the purpose of this appeal that
the Agreement to Pay Real Estate Commission contained in the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated March 11, 1985, constituted
an enforceable obligation pay a real estate commission.3
record

The

in this case establishes, however, that there was a

subsequent modification of that agreement, the terms of which
are set forth in the Note/Agreement/Assignment
April

1, 1985.

("NAA") dated

The NAA was signed, however, only by Leon

Sprouse and was not signed by Edmunds or his principal broker.
The trial court held that the modification was barred by the
statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds does not apply to this modification
because (1) the NAA modified only the terms of payment, whereas
the writing requirement of the statute of frauds applies only to
the term of employment, (2) neither Edmunds nor his broker was
the "party to be charged" and their signatures were not required
by the statute of frauds, and (3) the requisite signature was
provided in any event by documents signed by Edmunds and his
broker as part of the same transaction.

These arguments are

addressed in order.

3

Sprouse contended at trial that the agreement was unenforceable because of Edmunds1 failure to procure a ready,
willing, and able buyer, and by Edmunds1 misrepresentations
concerning Jager's ability to pay for and operate the motel.
The facts were in dispute with respect to that issue, and the
trial court found the issues in favor of Edmunds.
Sprouse
accordingly does not challenge that finding on appeal.

11

A*

Because The NAA Altered Only Terms Of Commission Payment.
And Not Terms Authorizing The Broker To Sell, The NAA Is
Not Within The Statute Of Frauds.
The

general

rule

governing

modifications

of

contracts

within the statute of frauds is "that if the original agreement
is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that
modifies any of the material parts of the original must also
satisfy the statute."

Allen v. Kingdom, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah

1986) (emphasis added).

Yet, there are many exceptions.

As

indicated above, if a subsequent modification is not a "material
part"

of the

statute.

contract, the modification

is not within

the

The discerning question is what is a "material part"

of the contract.
In C. J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P. 2d 923~ (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), the court discussed what is "material" in a broker's
contract.

After finding that Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) applies

to brokers1 contracts generally, including finders' contracts,
the court said that "the essential part of a contract to employ
a

real

estate broker, so far as the statute of

concerned, is the matter of employment."

frauds is

Id. at 928 (quoting

Prav v. Anthony, 96 Cal. App. 772, 274 P. 1024, 1029 (1929)).
The Utah Code itself provides that:
In the following cases, every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:

12

(5)
Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation,
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 25-5-4

(1989

(prior

to

1989

amendment))

It is clear that the "material parts11 of a

(emphasis added) .

broker's contract are those terms that employ him.

Subsequent

modification of those terms must be in writing, and subscribed
by the party to be charged.

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas,

669 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985).

In this instance, however, the

NAA does not alter terms that "authorize" or "employ."

Mr.

Edmunds was previously authorized to sell the property for a
commission, and had performed.

Rather, the NAA alters the terms

for compensation and is nothing more than a security agreement.
These terms are not "material parts" of the original contract
within the statute of frauds.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 makes it clear that the purpose of
the statute of frauds is to protect interests in real property.
In

particular,

property

the

owners

commissions."

purpose

from
C

of

§

fraudulent

25-5-4(5)
and

is

fictitious

"to

protect

claims

J. Realty, Inc., 758 P. 2d at 927

Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)).

for

(citing
In other

words, because the owner employing the broker has an interest in
real property, the legislators sought to protect him against
claims for commission when the brokers were never "authorized"
or "employed."

As the result, the contract that "authorizes" or

"employs" the broker must be in writing and subscribed by the
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party to be charged; while the contract involving only the terms
of commission does not.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated several times that § 255-4(5) does not apply to terms of commission.

In Fowler v.

Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), a dispute arose between two
brokers over the terms of their commissions.
between the two was oral, and the defendant

The contract
contended

because it was oral, the statute of frauds barred
formance.

The court held that it did not.

that

its per-

The contract was

merely an agreement over the terms of commission.

554 P.2d at

208.
Golden Key Realty,

Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730

(Utah

1985), involved a situation more analogous to the one presented
here.

In Golden Key, the issue was whether an executory accord

over the terms of commission was within the statute of frauds.
The court found that an accord is not within the statute of
frauds even though the original contract is, unless the accord
itself is the type of contract within the statute.
732-33.

699 P.2d at

The court held that the modification contract was not

within the statute, although it altered the terms of commission
and was between the broker and the landowner.

Id.

The NAA in

the instant case similarly was not within the statute of frauds.
B.

Even If The NAA Is Within The Statute Of Frauds, The Broker
Is Not A "Party to be Charged11 And Need Not Evince Acceptance Of The NAA Bv Signature.
Every contract for the sale of land must be "in writing

subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be
14

made,"

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3

(1989). In other words, the

party conveying the land must sign the contract to satisfy the
requirements of the statute.
421,

424

interest

(Utah 1986).

Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d

This is to protect owners having an

in real property

from buyers suing to force sale.

Buyers, on the other hand, need not sign the contract to make it
enforceable because they are not "the party to be charged."

Id.

LeVine v. Whitehouse. 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2 (1910).
With

real

estate

commissions,

the

same

rule

applies.

Contracts authorizing or employing the broker to sell property
are within the statute of frauds to protect the landowners
against fraudulent claims for commission.
P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976).

Fowler v. Taylor, 554

Landowners have an interest in real

property that merits the statute's protection.

Consequently,

only the landowner must sign the real estate contract authorizing and employing the sale to satisfy the requirements of the
statute.
Any modification of a contract employing a broker is also
within the statute of frauds and must be signed by the landowner
as well.
733

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732,

(Utah 1985).

broker

must

sign

Nevertheless, it does not follow that the
a

modification

to

satisfy

the

statute.

Modifications must meet the same statutory requirements as the
original, Strevell-Paterson Co.. Inc. v. Francis. 646 P.2d 741,
742 (Utah 1982), but no requirement exists for the broker to
sign the original.

Simply because the broker gets a commission
15

does not mean that he acquires an interest in land that merits
the statute's protection.

The broker has no such interest.

His

fight is only for a commission, and the statute was not enacted
for that purpose.

See Fowler, 554 P.2d at 208; see also Golden

Key Realty, 699 P.2d at 732, 733.
This is not to say that the vendor may unilaterally alter
the terms of the broker's commission; neither can the vendor
alter terms of the sale without the vendee's assent.

Clearly,

the broker has rights in the contract and any modification must
be assented to.
signature.

The point is that he need not assent by

The broker is not "a party to be charged" and can

evince acceptance of a modification as any party would who is
not a party to be charged.
In this case, Mr. Edmunds' signature as assignee of the
Assignment of Contract and as assignor of the Assignment of Note
(Exhibits 16 and 18, respectively), his receipt of payments
pursuant to the NAA, and his attempts to claim benefits under
the NAA obviously manifest his assent to the NAA instrument and
bind him to its terms.
C.

Even If The NAA Is Within The Statute Of Frauds And Edmunds
Is A Party To Be Charged, A Sufficient Writing Exists That
Will Satisfy The Statute.
Most American jurisdictions agree that " [compliance with

the Statute of Frauds is not limited to a single, signed piece
of paper, but may be evidenced by several documents clearly
related."

Knight v. American Nat'l Bank, 756 P.2d 757, 760

(Wash. App. 1988) .

Utah has long accepted this rule.
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See

Miller v. Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949, 951, 952 (1926)
(several deeds to exchange land satisfied the statute though not
signed by all parties); Midwest Realty v, City of West Jordan.
541 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Utah 1975) (city council's minutes containing the terms and provisions of an agreement

satisfied the

statute); In re Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549, 550 (Utah
1979) (three receipts which referred to a real estate transaction as a "sale," stated the consideration

for the sale,

acknowledged receipt of part payment, referred to "11 acres in
Alpine,"

and

were

subscribed

by

the

seller

statute); Greaerson v, Jensen, 617 P.2d

satisfied

369, 372, 373

the
(Utah

1980) (an unsigned deed that contained the names of the parties
and a description of the land involved, and a signed check
referring to the deed, satisfied the statute).
In Greaerson, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the requirements that several writings must meet to satisfy the statute of
frauds.

The court found that several writings may be construed

together as containing all the terms of a contract, though they
are not all signed by the party to be charged, provided that
some nexus between the writings is shown.

Greaerson, 617 P.2d

at

"either by

372, 373.

reference
implied

This nexus can be

shown

express

in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or by
reference

gleamed

[sic]

writings and the circumstances
Id. at 373 (emphasis added) .

from

the

contents

of

the

surrounding the transaction."
If the reference in the signed

writing is implied, the writings must "clearly refer to the same
17

subject matter or transaction."

Id.

Moreover,

reference may be shown by parol evidence.

Id.

an

implied

In Gregerson,

the court found that because there was an implied reference in
the

signed

check

to the unsigned

deed

and

several

express

references to the contract, including the contents of the deed,
together with the fact that the bank had custody of the deed
within

a

few

acknowledged

days

after part

the propriety

payment

and

of the deed,

that

the vendor

a sufficient

nexus

between the writings existed, and the writings satisfied the
statute of frauds.
In this instance, three writings satisfy the demands of the
statute.

They are:

interest

in

the

(1) the NAA, granting Interwest a security

payments

Leon

Sprouse

received -under

his

contract dated March 29, 1985 (Exhibit 15); (2) the Assignment
of Contract by which Interwest assigned its rights in the NAA to
Artie Edmunds (Exhibit 16) ; and (3) the Assignment of Note by
which Artie Edmunds assigned his rights in the NAA to Draper
Bank & Trust (Exhibit 18) .

Because the NAA and the Assignment

of Contract are dispositive in this matter, this discussion will
focus on those two writings.4
A clear nexus exists between the NAA and the Assignment of
Contract that satisfies the statute of frauds.

The Assignment

provides that the seller in the contract dated March 29, 1985,

4

However, virtually everything discussed about the nexus
between the NAA and the Assignment of Contract applies with
equal force to the nexus between the NAA and the Assignment of
Note.
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"has conveyed

to

Interwest

Commercial

Properties

a security

interest of $25,000.00 as set forth in the attached note agreement dated April 1, 1985."
seller referred to.

(Exhibit 16.)

Leon Sprouse is the

The NAA is the only note agreement by

which, on April 1, 1985, Leon Sprouse granted to Interwest a
$25,000.00 security interest in his contract.

The Assignment

can have reference to no other writing but the NAA.

Moreover,

the NAA was attached to the Assignment and was dated the day
before the Assignment.
Without question, the Assignment refers to the NAA.

The

Assignment was signed by Interwest, the secured party in the
NAA, and by Mr. Watson, the owner of Interwest.

The Assignment

is a signed writing with an "express reference" to the unsigned
NAA, and these two writings, taken together, satisfy the statute
of frauds.
plainly

See Gregerson, 617 P.2d at 373.

show

that

the NAA modifies

These two writings

Leon Sprousefs

original

contract to employ Interwest or Mr. Edmunds as contained in the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and that enforcement of the NAA is
not barred by the statute of frauds.
POINT II
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED
THAT EDMUNDS CONSENTED TO THE MODIFICATION
OF THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AGREEMENT.
The trial court found that "defendant has failed to meet
his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written or
oral modification of his obligation to pay a commission . . . ."
(Findings, para. 8, (R. vol. Ill, p. 149).)
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This finding should

be reversed by this court because it is contrary to the great
weight of the evidence.

In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885,

886 (Utah 1989).
Sprouse testified at trial that Edmunds had agreed, prior
to the execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on March
11, 1985, that payment of the $25,000.00 commission would be
contingent upon receiving payments from the buyers, Jager.
testimony was corroborated

by the only

This

independent witness,

James Ivins, who prepared the documents which were signed at the
closing of the transaction.

Mr. Ivins testified that Edmunds

had instructed him that payment of the commission was contingent
upon receiving payments from Jager, and that Sprouse was to have
no personal liability

for payment of the commission.

Ivins

testified that he prepared the NAA to reflect that agreement.
Edmunds

and his principal broker accepted

the NAA,

and the

principal broker assigned it to Edmunds on April 2, 1985.

On

April 24, 1985, Edmunds assigned the NAA to Draper Bank & Trust
as security for a loan.
Shortly after this action was commenced, Edmunds filed an
affidavit claiming rights in the subject property by virtue of
the NAA.
Answer

(R. vol. I, pp. 47-50.)
to

Second

Amended

Edmunds thereafter filed his

Complaint;

Plaintiff and Cross-Claim Against Jagers.
34, copy attached as Appendix G.)

Counterclaim

Against

(R. vol. I, pp. 126-

Edmunds therein claimed an

interest in the real property under the NAA, and counterclaimed
against Sprouse to assert that interest.
20

He also cross-claimed

against Jager seeking foreclosure and a deficiency judgment in
the event

the proceeds

satisfy Edmunds' claim.

of

foreclosure were

insufficient

to

Most notably, he did not pray for a

money judgment against Sprouse on the real estate commission.
This apparently deliberate acknowledgement

of no right to a

money judgment against Sprouse continued through the pre-trial
order.

(R. vol. I, pp. 154-63.)

It was not until after Sprouse

filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Edmunds1
right

to

default

recover

the

commission

had

terminated

by

Jager's

(R. vol. I, pp. 180-81, 217-33), that Edmunds first

asserted that the NAA was not binding and enforceable and that
Sprouse was personally obligated to pay the commission.

(R.

vol. I, pp. 236-40, 241-50.)
Edmunds1 principal broker, Roy Larsen, testified that he
understood that the brokerage had agreed to take a note for the
payment of the commission with deferred payments (Tr. 25) , and
that the note (the NAA) was subsequently assigned in full to
Edmunds (Tr. 27) .

Edmunds, who was the only representative of

the brokerage who attended the closing, testified that payment
of

the

commission

was

not

provided

for

in

the

statement, because it would be paid under a note.
That note was the NAA.

settlement
(Tr. 110.)

(Tr. 121.)

In summary, all of the evidence at trial established that
Edmunds and his broker had treated the obligation to pay the
commission

has being

contained

solely

in the NAA,

accepted the NAA and the benefits received under it.
21

and had
The only

contrary

testimony

was

the

self-serving

testimony

of

the

principal broker, who testified that he had not agreed to any
modification of the commission agreement.

(Tr. 26.)

He further

testified, however, that a week or two after closing he became
aware of the provision in the NAA which states that Sprouse was
not personally obligated to pay the real estate commission, and
stated that he discussed that provision with Mr. Edmunds at that
time.

(Tr. 27.)

Edmunds denied that he had ever heard of that

provision until after the litigation was commenced.

(Tr. 119-

20.)
The only other evidence offered against the enforceability
of the NAA was the self-serving testimony of Mr. Edmunds, who
acknowledged receiving the NAA and assigning it to his bank as
security for a loan, but who claimed he was not aware of the
provision limiting Sprouse's personal liability and that he did
not agree to any such provision.
Where all the evidence showed that both Edmunds and his
principal broker had accepted the NAA and that all their acts,
until well after the commencement of this litigation, were in
accordance with the proposition that Sprouse was not personally
liable

for

payment

of

the

commission,

and

where

the

only

independent testimony established that Edmunds had specifically
dictated the terms of the NAA and had agreed to them, the trial
court's finding that Sprouse failed to carry his burden of proof
of showing consent to the modification was clearly erroneous.
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Sprouse is aware of the numerous decisions which hold that
the findings of the trial court on disputed issues of fact will
not

be

reversed

unless

clearly

erroneous,

and

that

great

deference is given to the trial court's ability to assess the
credibility of the witnesses.

The Utah Supreme Court has also

frequently stated, however, that self-serving statements of a
witness are entitled to little weight, particularly where the
witness's actions contradict his statements.

For example, in

First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980),
the Court addressed the question of whether an after-acquired
property clause, or dragnet clause, in a mortgage agreement
executed by Shiew in Monticello, Utah, also operated to secure a
subsequent loan obtain by Shiew from the bank in Price, Utah.
The Court established that one of the factors in determining
whether the dragnet clause was enforceable was whether the bank
had relied on the security in extending the loan.
957.

609 P.2d at

The bank officer who prepared the Price loan testified

that he was aware of the Monticello loan and was aware of the
dragnet clause in the mortgage and relied on the Monticello
property as constituting additional security for the Price loan.
(609 P.2d at 958-59) (Hall, J., dissenting).

A majority of the

Court nonetheless held that "[t]he self-serving statements of
the bank officer" were "of no evidentiary value."

609 P.2d at

957.
Of

similar

effect

is

Controlled

Receivables,

Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966).
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Inc.

v.

The plaintiff in

that case sought to overcome the presumption of delivery of
certain deeds which he had previously executed in favor of his
children, and which he claimed where intended to be effective
only

upon

judgment

his

death.

against

the

The

Supreme

plaintiff,

Court

affirmed

notwithstanding

summary

his

clear

testimony concerning his intentions, stating that his "testimony
that he did not intend title to pass prior to his death is selfserving and inconsistent with his actions."

413 P.2d at 810.

See also Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520 P.2d
200, 203 (Utah 1974) (judgment of dismissal in jury action at
close

of

plaintiff's

evidence

affirmed

notwithstanding

the

plaintifffs testimony, because the testimony was self-serving).
The trial court's reliance in the instant case on the selfserving statements of Edmunds and his principal broker, to the
exclusion

of

independent

all

the

testimony,

other

evidence,

was clearly

including

erroneous.

The

the

only

evidence

established as a matter of law that Edmunds accepted the NAA,
and was bound by all provisions of it.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING PORTIONS OF THE
NAA WHILE HOLDING OTHER PORTIONS UNENFORCEABLE.
The trial court's ruling in this case permitted Edmunds to
have his cake and eat it too.

The trial court held that Edmunds

was not bound by the provision of the NAA which eliminated the
personal

liability

of

Sprouse,

yet

held

that

Edmunds

was

entitled to recover benefits under the other portions of the
24

NAA,

specifically

premises,

those

provisions

relating

relating

to

to a

lien

interest,

on the
and

subject

provisions

relating to attorney fees.

This legal conclusion should be

reviewed

a

by

this

court

on

correctness

standard

with

no

deference to the trial court.
The NAA was clearly an "entire," as opposed to "severable,"
contract.

The distinction between the two depends on the intent

of the parties:
A contract is severable or entire
depending on the intent of the parties at
the time they entered into the contract.
This
intent
should
be
ascertained first from the four
corners of the instrument itself,
second from other contemporaneous
writings
concerning
the
same
subject matter, and third from the
extrinsic parol evidence of the
intentions.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d
406, 408 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
The four corners of the NAA will admit of no other conclusion but that it was an "entire" contract.

Nothing in the

contemporaneous writings would alter that conclusion, and it is
further supported by the extrinsic parol evidence.
testified,

and

acceptance

of

there
the

was

Earnest

no

contrary

Money

Sales

evidence,
Agreement

Sprouse
that

his

and

his

execution of the NAA was contingent upon the understanding that
he would not be personally liable for the sales commission.
(Tr. 179.)
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Because the contract was entire, severable enforcement was
improper.

Either the whole contract must be enforced, or no

portion of it.
The trial court's award of 12% pre-judgment

interest is

supported only by the NAA.

Sprouse argues that the NAA should

be binding in all respects.

If this Court holds that it is not

binding, however, it follows that the interest at 12% must be
reversed.

Absent

the

provisions

of

interest which may be charged is 10%.

the

NAA,

the

maximum

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-

1(2) (Supp. 1989).5
Edmunds1 claim of a lien on the motel and to an entitlement
to the proceeds of the foreclosure is similarly based solely on
the NAA.

Sprouse disputes Edmunds1 claim to an interest in the

proceeds of foreclosure, because there were no such proceeds.
Sprouse purchased the property at the foreclosure sale by a
credit bid, i.e., the bid of $360,000.00 was credited against
Jager's obligation to Sprouse, and reduced the obligation by
that amount.

No cash was paid.

It follows that there was no

proceeds upon which a lien could attach.

In any event, however,

the right to a lien arises only out of the NAA.
judgment

providing

for a lien

is an error

The Court's

for the reasons

discussed above.

5

The 12% interest rate provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-14 (1989) applies only to judgments other than on a contract.
Judgments on contracts bear interest at the rate specified in
the contract. Where no interest rate was specified, it follows
that the statutory rate of 10% would apply both before and after
judgment.
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Finally, the Courtfs award of attorney fees is grounded
only in the NAA.6

The entire award of attorney fees must be

vacated.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
The

Trial

Court

awarded

$9,000*00 for attorney fees.

judgment

against

Sprouse

for

The entire text of the testimony

relating to attorney fees is set forth in Appendix H.

Notably

lacking is any testimony as to the reasonableness of the fees.
Even if the fees were determined to be reasonable, the evidence
established that Edmunds was entitled to recover, at most, a fee
of only $3,000.00.

In addition, the previous point establishes

that there was no contractual basis for an award of any attorney
fees.
M

An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence in the

record which supports the award."
Reichert, 122 Utah Adv. Rep, 46, 49
1989).

Regional Sales Agency v.
(Utah Ct. App. Nov. 24,

This requirement is not satisfied by merely testifying

as to the number of hours spent.

In Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d

83 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), for example, this Court reversed an
award of attorney fees where no evidence of reasonableness was
presented:
6

The findings also assert that the award of attorney's
fee is based on a provision of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. The copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement admitted
into evidence, however, does not contain any provision relating
to attorney fees. (Exhibit 2.)
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At the close of plaintiff's case, her
counsel proffered testimony and produced an
exhibit
itemizing
the time and
costs
expended by him, his associate, and his
clerk, and the hourly rates charged for
each. Conspicuously absent is any evidence
"regarding the necessity of the number of
hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the
rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and the result accomplished, and
the rates commonly charged for divorce
actions in the community . . . . w Kerr v.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980).
739 P.2d at 84.

The Court in Talley accordingly reversed the

award of attorney fees.
Although Talley dealt with a divorce case, the same principles apply to all cases where an award of attorney fees is
sought.

Regional Sales Agency, supra.

The evidence in this

case is wholly insufficient to support a finding of reasonableness.

The entire award must therefore be reversed.
Even if this Court were to determine that the evidence was

sufficient
evidence

to justify the award of some attorney
clearly

$9,000.00.

does

not

justify

the

award

of

fees, the
a

fee

of

A party is entitled to recover attorney fees only on

the issue on which is prevailed.
Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d

rehearing denied,

Mountain States Broadcasting

643, 649 n. 10

(Utah Ct. App.

113 Utah Adv. Rep. 41

1989),

(Ct. App. July 20,

1989) .
Edmunds1 attorney testified at trial that only one-third of
his time, or $3,000.00, was spent in pursuing recovering on the
promissory

note

(the

NAA),

the

28

issue

upon

which

Edmunds

ultimately

prevailed.

The

balance

of

the

award

must

be

disallowed in any event.
CONCLUSION
The

Note/Agreement/Assignment

executed

by

Sprouse

was

accepted, as a matter of law, by Edmunds, both by his signature
to other documents executed as part of the same transactions,
and by his subsequent assignment of and reliance on the agreement.

This case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss

the complaint against Sprouse.
In

the

alternative,

the

case

should

be

remanded

with

instructions to vacate the award of interest at 12%, to vacate
the attorney fees, and to vacate the judgment granting Edmunds a
lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.

As a final

alternative,

reduced

the

attorney

fees

award

should

be

$3,000.00.
DATED this 8th day of January, 1989.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
//
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN^
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX "A"
Reinstated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiff${_££;; .-^
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//
60 North 300 East
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St. George, Utah 84770
Dtrun
Telephone: (801) 628-2612
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
LEON SPF.OUSE,
Plaintiff,

]
•

vs.
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, i
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, ]
and JOHN DOES I throgh V,
]1
Defendants.
ROY N. LARSEN, ARTIE EDMUNDS,
and INTERWEST COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

REINSTATED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JULY 11, 1989 NUNC
PRO TUNC FOR
NOVEMBER 9, 1988

]
]
]

vs.
LEON SPROUSE,
Third-Party Defendant.

]i
)

Civil No. 86-0982

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on July 1, 1988 on the third-party plaintiffs1 (hereinafter
referred to as plaintiffs) complaint against third-party
defendant (hereinafter referred to as defendant) and on the
counterclaim said defendant filed against plaintiffs, the
pleadings having been properly joined. Plaintiffs appeared with
their attorney, John L. Miles, and presented evidence, testimony
and witnesses in their behalf, and defendant Leon Sprouse
appeared with his attorneyr R. Clayton Huntsman, and presented
evidence, testimony and witnesses in his behalf. The matter was
fully tried tp the Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District
Court Judge, presiding. At the conclusion of the trial, both
parties having rested, the Court requested counsel for both
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda on July 18, 1988 on

one legal issue and to also submit any closing argument in
writing at the same time. The parties having filed their
memoranda and closing arguments, and the Court having heard the
evidence and testimony at trial, and having reviewed the
memoranda and written closing arguments, and good cause
appearing, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That this Court has jurisdiction of the parties and
of the subject matter in this action and that venue is
appropriate before this Court. The Court finds that plaintiff
Roy N. Larsen is, and was at all material times herein, a
licensed Utah real estate broker, and is entitled to bring this
action for the recovery of the commission sought in this case.
2. The Court finds that defendant entered into a valid
and binding agreement to pay a real estate commission of
$25,0 00.0 0 when defendant executed the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement (Trial Exhibit P-2) on March 11, 1985, in which
defendant accepted the offer of Argen Jager to purchase his Oasis
Motel property.
3. The Court finds that, by the explicit language
contained in the section of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
titled AGREEMENT TO PAY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, that defendant

agreed to pay the $25,000.00 commission at the time of closing.
4. The Court finds that the closing on defendant's
sale of the Oasis Motel to Argen Jager was held and completed on
March 29, 1985 in St. George, Utah, and that Argen Jager took
pos&^ssion of the Oasis Motel and made monthly payments to
defendant for 13 months before defaulting by failing to make the
payment due June 1, 1986.
5. The Court finds that plaintiffs had procured a
buyer who was ready, willing, and able and who was accepted by
defendant and .that the commission was fully earned and due at
said closing on March 29, 1985.
6. The Court finds that none of the commission was
paid at the closing because there were no funds available at

closing as defendant had agreed to accept equity in traded
properties as Argen Jager1s $85,000.00 down payment.
7. The Court finds that plaintiffs, at defendant's
request, orally consented to a deferred payment of the commission
merely to accommodate the defendant by providing a convenient
mode or method of payment, as the funds to pay the commission
were not available at the closing. The Court finds that this
oral arrangement only changed the time of payment and did not
change or alter defendant's obligation to pay the commission.
The Court further finds that defendant, but not plaintiffs,
signed Trial Exhibit P-15, a "NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT". The
Court finds that the "note" and "assignment" portions of Trial
Exhibit P-15 is binding en defendant and obligates defendant to
pay twelve (12%) percent interest on the commission and costs and
expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
and secures those obligations by a partial assignment of the
Arjen Jager Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Court_ finds that
Trial Exhibit P-15 is not binding on plaintiffs, specifically the
"agreement" portion, as it was not signed by plaintiffs, nor does
the Court find that plaintiffs orally agreed to the "agreement"
portion, as set out in the second to last paragraph.
8. The Court finds that defendant has failed to meet
his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written or oral
modification of his obligation to pay a commission, which
modification defendant contends would release or excuse him from
further payments on the commission obligation if Mr. Jager
defaulted. The Court further finds that defendant has failed to
meetiiis burden of proof on his claim that plaintiffs' acceptance
of 13 monthly payments was either part performance of such a
modified written or oral agreement or a waiver of plaintiffs'
claim for the commission. The Court finds that plaintiffs'
acceptance of 13 monthly payments were not acts that were
exclusively referable to any modification of the commission
agreement, but that accepting such payments was consistent with
defendant's obligation to pay the commission in deferred payments
as set forth in the "note" portion of Trial Exhibit P-15. The

acceptance of such payments is therefore not evidence of nor part
performance of the "agreement" portion of Trial Exhibit P-15.
9. The Court finds that plaintiffs and defendant did
not enter into any written or oral agreement that: would modify or
alter defendant's agreement and obligation to pay the $25,000.00
commission.
10. The Court finds that the balance due as of July 1,
1988 on defendants obligation to pay a $25,000.00 commission,
after giving credit for the 13 monthly payments received, is
$24,239.46.
11. The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to a
judgment for said balance of $24,239.46, and that the judgment
should carry interest at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per
annum from July 1, 19 88 until paid.
12. The Court finds that the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement (Trial Exhibit P-2) provides in paragraph B of its
General Provisions that any defaulting party is obligated to pay
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
which may arise from enforcing the agreement, and that defendant
is therefore obligated to pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's
fees. In addition, as independent grounds for the recovery of
attorney's fees, the Court finds that Trial Exhibit P-15
obligates defendant to pay all costs and expenses of collection,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, if defendant defaulted on
his agreement to pay the commission in monthly installments. The
Court finds that defendant did default on the payments required
by Trial Exhibit P-15, and that plaintiffs are therefore entitled
to recover their costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
13. The Court finds that a reasonable attorney's fee
in this matter is $9,000.00, based upon evidence that plaintiffs'
attorney devoted in excess of 150 hours at an hourly rate of
$60.00 per hour, which rate the Court finds reasonable.
14- . The Court finds that defendant gave plaintiffs an
assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract (Trial Exhibit P-3) when defendant signed Trial Exhibit
P-15. The Court further finds that plaintiffs are therefore

entitled to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale of the
Oasis Motel, which the Court finds was held on December 10, 1987,
at which the Oasis Motel property was sold to defendant as the
highest bidder for the bid of $360,000.00.
15. The Court finds, on the defendant's counterclaims,
that defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence that plaintiffs made any material false
or misleading statements or representations in connection with
the sale of the Oasis Motel to Argen Jager or that defendant
justifiably relied thereon to his detriment. Further, the Court
finds that plaintiffs did not negligently make any false
representations in this matter, nor has defendant shown any
evidence that plaintiffs breached any contract or agreement or
their fiduciary duty to defendant. Therefore, the Court finds
that the counterclaims of the defendant are without merit and
should be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
16. The Court finds that a judgment was previously
signed and entered in this matter on November 5, 1987 in favor of
defendant and against Arjen W. Jager in the amount of
$472,473.40. The Court finds that this judgment includes the
commission which defendant now seeks to avoid. The Court finds
defendant's positions inconsistent, and finds that by obtaining
a judgment against Mr. Jager that includes the commission,
defendant has acknowledged his own liability for the commission,
and that this constitutes independent grounds in support of the
above findings that defendant is liable for the commission.
17. The Court finds that the defendant and plaintiffs,
by arranging to pay the commission with monthly payments over a
four year period as provided in Trial Exhibit P-15 and as shown
by Trial Exhibit P-20, manifested their intent that the
commission should be paid in full long before the Uniform Real
Estate Contract with Mr. Jager (Trial Exhibit P-3) was paid in
full. The Court finds that the parties intended that the
commission would be fully paid by the time the Jager contract
balance was approximately $375,000.00 as shown by Trial Exhibit
P-22. The Court finds that defendant gave plaintiffs a partial

assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in the Jager contract to
secure the payment of the commission (see finding 7 above). The
Court finds that under these circumstances where the intent was
to pay the commission first, it is equitable to apply the
$360,000.00 proceeds of the Sheriff1s sale first to the
commission, and the balance to the retained interest of
defendant. The Court finds that the assignment and Sheriff's
sale constitute independent grounds for plaintiffs' recovery of a
commission from defendant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction of the
parties and of the subject matter and that venue is proper.
2. The Court concludes that UCA §25-5-4(5) requires a
real estate commission agreement to be in writing.
3. The Court concludes that Trial Exhibit P-2 (Earnest
Money Sales Agreement) contains an enforceable written agreement
obligating defendant to pay plaintiffs a $25,000^00 commission.
4. The Court concludes that when a commission
agreement is required by law to be in writing, that any
alteration or modification thereof must also be in writing and
signed by the party, plaintiffs in this case, to be charged with
the modified agreement. The Court concludes that there is no
evidence of any written modification which has been signed by
plaintiffs.
5. The Court concludes that before the doctrine of
part performance can take an alleged oral modification of a
commission agreement out of the statute of frauds, the part
performance must consist of sufficient acts that are exclusively
referable to the oral agreement. The Court concludes that
defendant has failed to meet his burden by showing any acts of
part performance that are exclusively referable to the alleged
oral modification that would excuse payment of the commission if
Mr. Jager defaulted.
6. The Court concludes that there was no written or
oral modification of defendant's obligation to pay a $25,000.00
commission, but only an agreement to provide a convenient mode or
jk

*~r>

method for deferred payment.
7. fhe Court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment in the principal sum of $24,239.46 on the commission
agreement and notef and the Court awards plaintiffs attorney's
fees of $9,000.00, for a total judgment of $33,239.46, said
judgment to bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from July If 1988 until paid.
8. "The Court concludes that the plaintiffs are
entitled by law to file their memorandum of costs, and that such
costs shall be included as part of the judgment.
9. 'the Court concludes that defendant's counterclaims
against plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice and on the
merits.
DATED this

^p
[Z- ^ day of July, 1989.

&J PHILIP E^ES
district Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of July, 1989, I
served an unsigned copy of the above and foregoing Reinstated
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Fred D. Howard,
attorney for Leon Sprouse, by depositing a copy in the United
States mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed to Fred D.
Howard, 120 Ea£t 300 North, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
LEON SPRCUSE,
Plaintiff,

]i
i

REINSTATED
JUDGMENT

I
1

JULY 11, 1989 NUNC
PRO TUNC FOR
NOVEMBER 9, 1988

vs.
APJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER,
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS,
and JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendants.
ROY N. LARSEN, ARTIE EDMUNDS,
and INTERWEST COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEON SPROUSE,
Third-Party Defendant.

u
#

\i
$

/v

'
:

1
'

Civil No. 86-0982

This matter having come on for trial on July 1, 1988 on
third-party plaintiffs1 (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs)
complaint against third-party defendant Leon Sprouse and on the
counterclaim filed by Mr. Sprouse against plaintiffs, with
plaintiffs appearing with their attorney, John L. Miles, and
Mr. *Sprouse appearing with his attorney, R. Clayton Huntsman, and
the pleadings being properly joined, and the Court having heard
the testimony of the witnesses and considered the evidence
presented, and the matter having been fully tried to the Court,
and the Court having made its Revised Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. That the counterclaims of defendant Leon Sprouse
against third-party plaintiffs are hereby dismissed with

prejudice and on the merits.
2. That the.third-party plaintiffs Roy H. Larsen,
Artie Edmunds, and Interwest Commercial Properties have judgment
against defendant Leon Sprouse in the amount of $33,239.46, plus
costs of Court.
3. That this judgment bears interest at the judgment
rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum from July 1, 1988 until
paid as provided by law.
DATED this /^H^day of July, 1989.

PHILIP EVj
Court Judge

m j strict

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of July, 1989, I
served an unsigned copy of the above and foregoing Reinstated
Judgment on Fred D. Howard, attorney for Leon Sprouse, by
depositing a copy in the United States mail, first-class postage
prepaid, addressed to Fred D. Howard, 120 East 300 North, P.O.
Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603.

APPENDIX "C
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Exhibit 2)

- A i l T ^ - S l MUiNJil 5AJLJb5 AlrKiiiUVlJUNT
Legend

Yes(X)

No(0)

This is a legally binding contract. Read both front and back carefully before signing.
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
T

/

/

DATE:
The undersigned Buyer.
hereby deposits with Agent/Broker Company
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount oi
r=
Dollars ($_
— ), in the form of
<—
which shell be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law.
Received by:

frj,\u7''

£,<rb*m^ffr^

Agent/Broker Company
OFFER TO PURCHASE
SSCRIPJION The abovistated EARNEST MONEY isxjiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property si
situated
PROPERTY DES
fcja^yf
ML* is
in the City of
>&'
fXieA^t.
County of (A Jr{JL^.
*~..n
. Utah,
UL L f
J
subject to any restrictivea covenants, 4oning regulations, utility or other easements or nghts^of way^overnment patentypr state deeds of record
approved by Buyer in accordance with Section 4. Said property is more particularly described as:
1.

at

Z£J

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES:
> B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

(Jfc-Commercial

U Residential

Q Other

• Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreege • Other

(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently anached to the
property: plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and
bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed
television antenna, wall-to-wail carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs. The
foffovfing personal
pe/isonaf property shail
shall aisoLbe
separate
witfc
warranties
ps$ototitle:
following
aisn.beincluded
includedininthis
thissate
saleand
andconveyed
conveyedunder
under
separateBUkpf
BUkpi?afe
Sale
with
warrantiesas
JULL
UdiMm^
fL<\JMi*IA<
AiUfM-Uu
jChl^f
flU*X£Hd*<t
_tt
rTWTZ/
1)^4=
(b| Excluded Items. The following itdms are specif icairy excluded from this sale:
AJ«J -*
J^ •_ *> •" ,J rM
**»
(c) Connections:'' Seller represents that the above property is connected to:
X& public sewer; O septic tank;vQmunicipal water; Dwell; Q netural gas; D irrigation water/secondary system; D other sanitary system
(specify)
_
1
£
(d) Utilities. Improvements, and Other Rights. The property presently has or is served by the following:
Gfepublic water main; O well; O water stub in; CTsewer main; O private water main; Q gas main; & electric distribution line; Q gas
aistributionlinerQ? telephone; D ingress and egress by private easement; ,23 dedicated road; pcrope;A0sidewalk;,Bcurb& gutter D water
rights, specify
•' • mineral rights, specify
;. D other, specify
(e) Survey. A certified survey D shall be furnished at the expense of
prior to Closing; ^Hh'all not be furnished.
of the property and subject to Section (d) above accepts it in its present physical
(f) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visua^ inspection
insp
condition, except: "'
ft^:tt' M J M ^ ^ T ^ - ^ '

/i

</*uxv
PURCHASE PRIGS AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is
Dollars {• JO.T i / D r ) &— f t - t< n>

^i^^JLz^U
flfWl^r"J"
) which shall be paid as follows:

.which represents the eforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
'representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note* real estate contract or other encumbrance to be
• assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ _ _ _ % per annum with monthly payments of *
which includes:, j Q-principal; Q interest;. Q taxes; D insurance.
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, reel estate contract or other
encumbrance to be assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
* ger annum with monthly payments of
$
whteh JnHnH—Q principal; O interest;' D taxes; D insurance.
*

. ^ j g l C V f ) ' represe hting balance, if any. Including refinancing, to be paid as follows^ LlxJf.

l^gjjfa

.PURC

<hi.' f' Jc^cfeJ

If outside financing is required. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to procure seme end this offer is mede subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending
institution granting said loan. Buyer agrees to make application for said loan within _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
days after Seller's acceptance
of this Agreement at an interest rate not to exceed
__%. Buyer further agrees to obtain a written commitment for said loan, and if the
commitment is not obtained within a reasonable time, this Agreement is voidable et the option of Seller.

amount of purchase price O an abstract of title brought current, with an attorney's opinion (See Paragraph I).
• 4. INSPECTION OF TtTLE. W t h i n _ l £ L -days after acceptance of this offer, Sailer shall provide Buyerwjth either a commitment for title
insurance or an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion. Buyer shall have a period of ! _ ^ _ d a y s after receipt thereof to
examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall mail written notice thereof, by certified mail, return receipt requested, within the prescribed
time period! Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defectfsl rs not
curable through an escrow agreement at closing* this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith
shall be returned to the respective parties.
5. •> VESTING OF TITLE. • Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: - Jrs

yt

^/WVN

h\f

h)\,

v

**r

witTi*-

6. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the
property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) ail obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or
other encumbrances.of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing,,heating, air conditioning and ventilating
systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. Exceptions to the above shall be limited to the
following:'
j\T>
a"'
1
'.
xjjiJ*'fifktm*\
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.. This offer is made_subject teethe following special conditions and/o&
contingencies which must be satisfied prior ie closing: . lALJ+jLyl
. .r^.
, V / J ^ — J -.. ^ w t / u ^ J ^ / ^ " j f ' C u v v ^
-''^nfTt(r-

™<£f' ' j p x y t u ^ ^

<
'
ft7f 1 1
" ,L - " T T 7
~—rys
8. CLOSING Or SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before
l*\
19-fcS-at a reasonable location to be designated
by Seller, subject to Paragraph K on the reverse side hereof. Upon demend. Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents
necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Paragraph L on reverse side, shair be made as
of CX^date of possession Q date of closing a other
,
__
9.

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on •.

10. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Agreement by reference.

— unless extended by mutual agreement of parties.

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provisions on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this

11. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ANO TIME UNNTFOR^ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and
conditions. Seller shall have until
H' Gb ffifr/PM) ,/H«»A^>* } 3
I Q ^^Im»r.r»ptthi*nH*r Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and
the Agent shall return the EARNEST MONErnfthe Buyer.
DATE

3 ""' 7 ' % T

SIGNATURE OF BUYER O

/ ts<?
CHECK ONE
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE-

w/4%slier hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
COUNTER OFFER
O Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications or specified In the attached Addendum and
COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance.
DATE J? ft*'/t'

TIME

^

(? !JQ

presents saic

SIGNATURE^ SELLER

CJAM^M)

£^Z&<*l<-<

C^>?^

REJECTION
O Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer.

(Seller's Initials)

AGREEMENT TO PAY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
CHECK ONE
O This property is listed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Listing Agent/Broker Compam.
and a real estate commission shall be paid in accordance with the Sales Agency Agreement The Selling Agent/Broker Company is
o/ /y*%tf 1 C^JKSH.JC^
"" ^foJtifttiirLi?
(j(/Y*\nrriil*itonS
rrt^yVtTu^
> Ustingand Sealing Agent/Brcjcer Compan
has been authorized to offer this property for sale and Seller agrees to pay a real estate commission of
l£j JB. J \lS} £W. ) aTconsideratio
for its efforts in procuring Buyer. Said commission shall be payable at closing or'
amount or due date thereof cannot be changed without the prior consent of the

DATE

3

m ,f

- 8 ^

SIGHAPJRBJSF SELLER
.f*1<L/

This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission.
FORM 123 — Long Gem Printing Co. Salt Lake City. Utah*

ADDENDUM TO
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Q

O * ATTACHMENT

COUNTEH OFFER

(Check 8ox)
Reference9 is made to EARNEST Mi
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT dated .
(Buyer) and

f/J,

pertainir q to the property situated at

. City

L\ M a f t .

19.
fCl / y <

^y_tt^y.i $

. . between
— (Seller)

,£4- £.gi~w ~gLXJ
7 * County. State of Utah.
.•.•/«,

en ? offer is contingent upon rrlutuai agreement to the following modified or additional terms and/or conditio?"? which, uoon
Accaptance of the attached
acceptance, shall be deemed incorporated in the offer previously set forth and shall control the terms of said instrument.
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If counter otfe\ .i expires s t .
. a.m.. p.m.
All above modifications or additions are hereby approved and accepted.

.19.

fad ~*>.~3-//-Kc
CMe
-a.m.. p.m.

Oate

Oate

.a.m.. p.m.

Seller

Oate

8uy*r

D O C U M E N T RECEIPT
(Utah State Law requires broker to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures to Buyer and Seller. Dependent on the method used, one of
the following forms must be completed.)
I acknowledge^receipt of a final copwof the foregoing bearing all signatures:

/.//-^y/a/A

% = r

Oate

Seller

Oate

Buyer

Oate
-OR-

! personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to the Seller Q. Buyer Q.
on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

•3-fr-frr

1 9 _ _ . by Certified Mail and the return receipt is attached hereto.

(Broker) by

Date

ADDENDUM TO
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
V * ATTACHMENT

Q

COUNTER OFFER

(Check Sox)
Reference is made tc EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT dated
iU£w

n

19-

if\Si«e«

(Buyer) and

aimrtg to the property situated at
pertaining
(f>.j>,A^ v

M-11
rit Y

Uh
Si.
(A ) L^LL^ -1/7^

, between
„ (Seller)

( ^ H ^
County. State of Utah.

j
" •is contingent upon mutual* agreement
menttot
Acceptance of the attached offer
to the following modified or additional terms and/or conditions which, upon
acceptance, %hni\ be 6B9tr\9d incorporated in the oiiw previously set forth and shall control the terms of said instrument.
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'•'. counter offer, it expires at.
.a.m., p.m..
Ail above modifications or additions are hereby approved and Accepted.

^

.a.m., p.m.

Oete

SA£.

•- • —^

-a.m.. p.m.

Seller

n«i»
Oate

Oate

Buyer

D O C U M E N T RECEIPT
(Utah State Law requires broker to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures to Buyer and Seller. Dependent on the method used, one of
the following forms must be completed.)
I acknowledge receipt of a fi/al copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures:

Oate

Oate

Seller

Buyer

Oate
--OR-

I personalty caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement beering all signatures to be mailed to the Seller Q. Buyer Q.
on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1Q

by Certified Ma ? and the return receipt is attached hereto.

(Broker) by

Oate

APPENDIX "D"
Note/Agreement/Assignment (Exhibit 15)

NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT

$.25.*.Q.Q.Q....Q.Q

.St ; .....Georg l e | y t a h

-AEEiLJti

iSK??..

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

_INTERWEST_^

420 West 145 N o r t h , S t . George

_UtahJM770
XUtm^JJ^lWSJ&mL-l

*

*.„

together with interest from date at the rate of...T£P. ..§*}.4....9£e.7.!).
the unpaid principaJ, said principal and interest payable as follows:

DOLLARS

($?±>.9.91dL.)t

.. per cerit (.. 9..\.r.%) per annum on

The sum of $640.00 commencing on or before May 1, 1985 and the
sum of $640.00 on or before the 1st. day of each and every month
thereafter until the full amount, is paid.
This note shall be due and payable in full upon the full payment.
to Leon Sprouse of all amounts owed to him on the sale of the

Oasis Motel, i f not e a r l i e r paid.
Each payment shall be applied (ust to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of.....Tw.eLue
per
cent 0,2^0--%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, die holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If tills note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, eidier with
suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
A reasonable attorney's fee.

or without

The Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to INTERWEST
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest as security for the
payments set forth above in and to that, certain Uniform Real Estate
Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller,
and Arjen W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, .located at. 231
West St.. George Blvd, St. George, Utah.
Further, the Undersigned hereby authorized and directs the escrow
holder, Heritage Thrift and Loan to pay from the payments received
under said escrow the full anount of this note/agreement to Interwest
according to the terms of this agreement.
The parties hereto understand and agree that this instrument, does
not obligate the undersigned to personally pay the amounts set forth
herein. The obligation for payment hereunder arises only out. of the
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom Real Estate Contract,
referred to above.
In the event that the buyer (Jager) or his heirs or assigns fails
or refuses to make the required payments under said Unifrom Real Estate
Contract, Interwest Commercial Properties may step in and take over
/
said contract. -5* /£-<m-? *3 sn**x**y f>s ^>^Uff
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APPENDIX "E"
Assignment of Contract (Exhibit 16)

NG CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD

"THIS IS A LEGALLY Bi

K COMPETENT ADVICE."

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT

THIS AGREEMENT, m a d e in the City ot ™ ™ . 5 ? ° * i ? .

hereinafter referred to as the

, State of Utah on the ....?.??.

d a y of

ai'sign"©^^^
84780

h e r e i n a f t e r referred to as the assignees,
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, under d a t e of . . M a r c h . . ? ? .
L.eQO..5p.rQU.S.B

19.95...,
, as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with

Arjen W. Jager
as buyers, of W a s h i n g t o n , U t a h , w h i c h contract is delivered h e r e w i t h , w h e r e i n a n d w h e r e b y the said sellers
a g r e e d to sell a n d the said buyers a g r e e d to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, a n d provisions therein set
f o r t h , all that certain l a n d , w i t h the buildings a n d improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying a n d being in
the County of W a s h i n g t o n

..., State of U t a h , a n d more particularly described as follows:

See attached Schedule A
Whereas the Seller has conveyed to Interutest Commercial Properties a security
interest of $25,000 as set forth in the attached note agreement dated April 1,
1985* Further the undersigned owner of Interutest Commercial Properties, Mel
Watson does assign and transfer all interest in said note to Artie Edmunds of
St. George Utah*

to which

agreement

in w r i t i n g , reference

is hereby

made

for all of the terms, conditions a n d

provisions

thereof, a n d
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors all of the right, title a n d Interest of the
assignors in said property above described as evidenced by said written agreement.
N O W , THEREFORE, it is hereby m u t u a l l y a g r e e d as follows:
1.

That the assignors in consideration of the Payment

of

Ten

Dollars a n d

other

good

and

valuable

consideration, the receipt of which is hereby a c k n o w l e d g e d , assign to the assignees, all their right, title a n d
interest in a n d to said
of

April
2.

1-

above described

property as evidenced by the aforesaid

, 1 9 . 8 S . . . concerning the obove described property.

fcta>faMKx6btt4x£x*)<K)&X\*WXk
Security

That to induce the assignees to p a y the said sum of money and

note

to accept the said contract, and the

rights obligation pursuant thereto the assignors hereby represent to the assignees as follows:
a . That the assignors h a v e duly p e r f o r m e d all the conditions of the said contract.
b. That the contract is n o w in full force and

effect a n d that the u n p a i d balance of said contract is

$..25JOQQ
, w i t h interest p a i d to the
c. That said contract is a s s i g n a b l e .
3.

That

in consideration

.I.sfe.

of the assignors executing and

d a y of

.April

19.9.5...

delivering this a g r e e m e n t , the assignees cove-

n a n t w i t h the assignors as follows:
a . That the assignees w i l l duly keep, observe a n d p e r f o r m all of the terms, conditions a n d provisions
of the said a g r e e m e n t

that a r e to be kept, observed a n d p e r f o r m e d by the assignors.

b. That the assignees w i l l save a n d hold harmless the assignors of a n d from a n y a n d all actions, suits,
costs, d a m a g e s , claims and

d e m a n d s whatsoever arising by reason of a n act or omission of the

assignees.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto h a v e hereunto set their hands a n d seals the d a y a n d
first a b o v e

/Z^.^L^!J2s,#u>
ITNCSt

Fumisn^d by:/
biwear

year

written.

VJ>

••••• m JBA^MA ta^

..^£/4.4..??nfc.^:

<&*y^_.

AtllCNONI

| f
\
• "*

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
* *
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APPENDIX "F"
Assignment of Note (Exhibit 18)

SEEK COAll'ETENT ADVISE"
ASSIGNMENT OF KKKSTKK3SKXK NOTE
THIS AGREEMENT, made in Ihecitvof
2 4 t h day of
April
hereinafter refened to as the assignors, and

Draper
1985 by and between

u

j£

<?{,-

, State of Utah on the
ARTIE EDMUNDS

DRAPER BAflK ffl# TRUST.

hereinafter referred to as tin* assignees,
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, under date of

4-1-85

,10

, LEON SPROUSK, Maker

tinUODCJCwitli
INTERHEST COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES * a s p a y e e
XXXJ&M^KK5> of
S t . George.
, Utah, which tmDdnoct is delivered herewith, wheiein and
whereby the said sellers agreed to sell and the said buyeis agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein set forth, all that certain land, with the buildings and improvements
thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in the County of
, State of Utah,
and more parlicularly described as follows:
N o t e f u r t h e r a s s i g n e d t o A r t i e Edmunds by I n t e r v e s t Commercial P r o p e r t i e s
by a s s i g n m e n t d a t e d A p r i l 2 , 1 9 8 5 , a 1 1 , p a y m e n t s on s a i d n o t e t o now b e p a i d
t o DRAPER DANK AND TRUST, 903 E a s t 12300 S o u t h , D r a p e r , Utah 8 4 0 2 0 , by r e a s o n
of t h i s a s s i g n m e n t .

to which agreement in writing, reference is hereby made for all of the terms, conditions and provisions thereof, and:
WHEREAS, (he assignee desiie to acquire from the assignors all of the light, title and interest
of the assignors in said propel ty above desciibed a s evidenced by said wiitten agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is heieby mutually agiecd as follows:
1. Thai the assignois is in oonsidoiation of I ho Payment of Ten Hollars and other good and valuable consideialion, the tcceipt of which is heieby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, all their
right, title and inteiest in and lo said above described propeity as evidenced by the afoiesaid UnifOfiMUZe&lCEaXKM^^
UoLn d t d 4 - 1 . - 8 5 .
,19
. , concerning the above described
property.
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract,
and the rights obligation pursuant thereto the assignors hereby represents to the assignees as
follows:
a. That the assignors have duly performed all the conditions of the said contiact.
b. That I he e<flQTRct is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said cont N £ g j s $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 , with interest paid to the
.4-1-35..
day of
,
19
c. That said contract is assignable.
3. That the assignors arc executing and delivering this agreement, as security for a loan made
to assignors under the terms of a promisory note of even date heiewith.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The paities hereto have hetcunto set their hands and seals the day
and year first above written.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Before me this
2 4 t h day of
April
198
personally appealed ARTIE EDMUNDS
X
the signer/*; off
foregoing sKsjgnmenl {ho duly acipmw^dge to me l(jiat
thev execute

APPENDIX "G
Answer to Second Amended Complaint;
Counterclaim Against Plaintiff and
Cross-Claim Against Jagers

WRIGHT & MILES
John L. Miles
Attorney for Defendant Edmunds
60 North 300 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-2612
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON SPROUSE,
Plaintiff,

I ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED
1 COMPLAINT; COUNTERCLAIM
I
AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND
i CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST JAGERS

vs.
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, '
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS,
and JOHN DOES I throgh V,
Defendants.

1

>

Civil No. 86-0982 Ayl/)/_

£*M¥^

COMES NOW defendant Artie Edmunds (hereinafter referred
to as "Edmunds"), by and through his attorney, John L. Miles, and
answers, counterclaims, and cross-claims as follows:
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of
paragrpah 1 of the second amended complaint (hereinafter referred
to as "complaint"). Defendant Edmunds claims he is the present
owner of a $25,000.00 assignment of part of said contract, given
by plaintiff to Interwest Commercial Properties, and that he is
therefore a necessary party plaintiff in any foreclosure action.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein by this
reference, is a copy of the NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT given by
plaintiff and which Edmunds now owns, pursuant to an ASSIGNMENT
OF CONTRACT attached hereto as Exhibit "B", and made a part
hereof by this reference*
2. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint.
3. Answering paragraph 5 of the complaint, defendant
Edmunds admits that he became aware, on or about September 16,
1986, that a lawsuit had been commenced between plaintiff and

defendant Jager, but denies any specific knowledge about the
alleged defaults of defendant Jager until on or about December 2,
1986, when a notice was served upon his attorneyf and denies the
remainder of said paragraph 5.
4. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of
paragraph 6 of the complaint.
5. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of
paragraph 7 of the complaint* Defendant Edmunds, as the owner of
part of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, claims that he
is a necessary party plaintiff in any action pursuant to said
contract, and claims that his contractual rights thereunder are
equal to those of plaintiff, the only difference being that his
claim is of a lesser amount than plaintiff, i.e., the balance
due (including interest and attorney's fees) on the $25,000.00
assignment. Further, defendant Edmunds also claims the right,
pursuant to Exhibits "A" and "B", and at his election, to take
over the contract and begin making monthly payments to plaintiff
at the time plaintiff delivers possession to him, but denies that
he must make up all delinquent payments that accrued prior to the
time defendant Edmunds was offered possession.
6. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of
paragraph 8 of the complaint, as defendant Edmunds claims to be a
necessary party in making such an election.
7. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of
paragraph 9 of the complaint for lack of knowledge.
8. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of
paragraph 10 of the complaint, and any such claimed interest of
defendant Nada R. Jager would also be inferior and subordinate to
defendant Edmunds assignment of plaintiff's lien.
9. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of
paragraph 11 of the complaint for lack of knowledge.
10. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of
paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint, and any such claimed
interest of defendant Walters or others would also be inferior
and subordinate to defendant Edmunds assignment of plaintiff's
lien.

COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF
1. That defendant Edmunds is the present owner of a
$25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
plaintiff and defendant Jager.
2. That plaintiff gave, for valuable consideration, an
assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in said contract to Interwest
Commercial Properties, as shown by the attached Exhibit "A".
3. That Interwest Commercial Properties thereafter
assigned, for valuable consideration, the $25,000.00 interest in
said contract to Edmunds, as shown by the attached Exhibit "B",
and Edmunds is the present owner thereof.
4. That Edmunds is therefore a necessary party
plaintiff in any foreclosure action.
5. That pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit *A", in
the event of the sale of Oasis Motel, Edmunds is entitled to full
payment of the balance owing on said $25,000.00, plus costs and
attorney's fees. Edmunds is entitled to such full payment
irrespective of how the Oasis Motel is sold and irrespective of
the price obtained. Upon the payment to plaintiff of the amounts
owed to him on any such a sale, the plaintiff is obligated to pay
Edmunds in full at that time.
6. That the Court should therefore order plaintiff to
pay the balance owed to Edmunds immediately upon any sale,
including a foreclosure sale.
7. That Exhibit nA" also directs the escrow holder to
pay the "full amount of this note/agreement" (emphasis added)
from the payments received, and that paragraph 16C of the
contract, under which plaintiff is proceeding, empowers the
escrow holder or agent to act as Trustee in any such foreclosure.
8. That the Court should direct Heritage Savings &
Loan, the Escrow Agent appointed by plaintiff and defendant
Jager, to apply the foreclosure proceeds first to the balance
owed to Edmunds and then to the balance owed to plaintiff.
9. That there has been a default in the payments
required by said Exhibit "A" in that no payments have been made
for several months.

10. That said Exhibit "A" provides for payment of
Edmunds attorney's fees and costs in the event of any defaultf
and the Court should award costs and a reasonable attorney's feef
and order that the same be paid in full along with the principal
and interest owing upon any sale.
11. That, as an alternative allegation in the event
the Court finds that Edmund's claim should not be paid first,
then Edmunds alleges that he is the owner and holder of an
undivided interest in the entire Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and that any payments received on said contract should be
allocated to Edmunds on a pro rata basis, with the numerator
being the balance (principal, interest, costs, and attorney's
fees) owed to Edmunds and the denominator being the balance
(principal, interest, costs, and attorney's fees) owed to
plaintiff.
12. That Exhibit "A" gives Edmunds the right or option
to take over the contract in the event defendant Jager fails to
make the required payments.
13. That Edmunds is entitled to reasonable notice of
f
Jager s failure to make the required payments before being called
upon to either exercise that option to take over the contract or
to forego that option.
14. That Edmunds was not afforded the opportunity to
exercise said option until defendant Jager was six or seven
months behind on his payments.
15. That Edmunds is entitled to exercise that option
without being required to make up all the monthly payments which
have accrued or will accrue prior to the time he was given notice
and prior to the time he is allowed to take over without making
up all those payments.
16. That Edmunds is willing, able, and desirous of
exercising his option to take over the contract and to begin
making the regular monthly payments, but he is not able to make
up the payments that accrued prior to the time he was given
notice and opportunity to exercise his option.
17. That Edmunds is entitled to possession of the

premises concurrently with the accrual of his obligation to begin
making the regular monthly payments to plaintiff, and until
plaintiff is able to place Edmunds in possession, Edmunds is
not required to make up any accrued payments or to make any
ongong payments.
18. That Edmunds is willing and able to take over the
contract and to begin making monthly payments as they come due as
soon as possession can be delivered to him, but without the
obligation to make up any accrued and delinquent payments.
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS JAGER
1. That Edmunds is the owner and holder of a
$25,000.00 interest in and to the payments due under that certain
Uniform Real Estate Contract between plaintiff, as Seller, and
defendant Arjen W. Jager, as Buyer, as shown by the Exhibits "A"
and "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.
2. That Edmunds, under the assignment wherein he
obtained said $25,000.00 interest, also obtained all of the
rights of a Seller under paragraph 16 of said contract, including
the right to treat the contract as a note and mortgage under
paragraph 16C and to foreclose thereon.
3. That defendant Arjen W. Jager has defaulted on his
payments under said contract by failure to make payments for the
months of June, 1986 through January, 1987.
4. That Edmunds is an indispensable party to any
foreclosure attempt by plaintiff as the owner of an interest in
said contract.
5. That Edmunds hereby elects the remedy of paragraph
16C of said contract, and elects to join with plaintiff in the
foreclosure of the property described in plaintiff's complaint
under said paragraph, and Edmunds hereby declares the
acceleration of all sums due under the contract.
6. That any interest claimed by defendant Nada H.
Jager in the property by reason of a deed recorded 6/21/86 in
Book 380, Page 380 of the records of the Washington County
Pecorder is inferior and subordinate to Edmunds interest and lien

in the contract which is sought to be foreclosed by this
cross-claim.
7* That Edmunds is entitled, pursuant to the terms of
Uniform Real Estate Contract, paragraph 14, to an award of his
attorney's fees and costs in this matter by reason of the default
of defendant Arjen W. Jager.
8. That the Court should order the property sold at a
foreclosure sale, and order the proceeds of the sale applied as
required by law, and that after application of such proceeds,
should there be a balance due and owing to Edmunds on the
$25,000.00 interest he acquired by assignment of said contract,
then Edmunds is entitled to a deficiency judgment against
defendant Arjen W. Jager for that balance then owing.
WHEREFORE, Edmunds prays for judgment as follows:
1. On the counterclaim against plaintiff, for judgment
declaring that Edmunds interest in the contract, together with
costs and attorney's fees found by the Court, is required to be
paid first from any proceeds of sale or other payments on the
contract, prior to any payment to plaintiff. Alternatively, for
judgment declaring that Edmunds interest in the contract,
together with costs and attorney's fees, is that of an undivided
interest in the entire contract and is required to be paid on a
pro rata basis with the interest of plaintiff from any proceeds
of a foreclosure sale or any other payments. Further, for
judgment allowing Edmunds to take possession of the premises
under his option without being liable to pay plaintiff the
accrued and past due monthly payments under the contract, which
are the obligation of defendant Jager who has been in possession,
or which plaintiff has waived by failing to give Edmunds
reasonable notice and opportunity to exercise the option and for
failure to deliver possession of the premises to Edmunds
concurrently with said notice and opportunity.
2. On the cross-claim against defendants Jager, for
judgment foreclosing the interest of said defendants in the
subject property, both real and personal, and that the Court
order the property sold and the proceeds be distributed as

required by law to any prior interests, to the costs and
attorney's fees of this foreclosure action, as found by the
Court, and then to the amounts due Edmunds and plaintiff, as the
Court determines their respective interests, and that Edmunds be
awarded a deficiency judgment against defendant Arjen W. Jager
for all amounts remaining unpaid after said foreclosure sale.
DATED this 12th day of January, 1987.

i?6hn L. Miles
Attorney For Artie Edmunds

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 1987,
I mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document on
each of the following by first-class D. S. Mail, postage prepaid:

GARY W. PENDLETON
Pendleton & Terry
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770

TERRY L. WADE
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake
50 East 100 South #302
P.O. Box 386
St. George, Utah 84770

^O^f

M^L^

NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNHENT

l.25.<.Q.Qfl^fl.O

H ^t..JSeorge M l s M Ujt8h

jbBEiLh-.
FOR

VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly

, w.?l

and severally, promise to pay to the order of

.JLWJSUWEST^

1*5 No£th, St.. George

„Utah_M7.7?.
JCHEMTJ^JSE^IIinUSMIL*

*

1

together with Interest from date at the rate o f . . X ? ? ? . . . J . ! l ^ ? 5 ? " j ! . ? M p e r
the unpaid principal, said principal and Interest payable as follows:

DOLLARS

{t*bJ!?li?.L.)t

cent ( i ! L . 5 % )

per annum on

The sum of $640.00 commencing on or before May 1, 1985 and the
sum of $640.00 on or before the 1st day of each and every month
thereafter until the full amount is paid.
This note shall be due and payable in full upon the full payment
to Leon Sprouse of all amounts owed to him on the sale of the
Oasis Hotel, if not earlier paid.
Each payment shall he applied first to accrued Interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
such Installment not paid when due shall bear Interest thereafter at the rate of.~_T.we.lue

per

cent (L2«'Q*%) pt* annum until paid.
If default occurs In the payment of said Installments of principal and Interest or any part thereof, or In
the performance of any agreement contained In the Trost Deed securing this nott% the holder hereof, at Its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default In the piymtnt of principal or Interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay qlf costs and expenses of collection Including
i reasonable attorney's fee.

the Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to INTERWEST
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest as security for the
payments set forth above In and to that certain Uniform Real Estate
Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller,
and Arjen W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, .located at 231
West St. George Blvd. St. George, Utah.
Further, the Undersigned hereby authorized and directs the escrow
holder, Heritage Thrift and Loan to pay from the payments received
under said escrow the full amount of this note/agreement to Interwest
according to the terms of this agreement.
The parties hereto understand and agree that this instrument does
not obligate the undersigned to personally pay the amounts set forth
herein. The obligation for payment hereunder arises only out of the
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom Real Estate Contract
referred to above.
In the event that the buyer (Jager) or his heirs or assigns fails
or refuses to make tlie required payments under said Unifrom Real Estate
Contract, Interwerf-Commercial Properties may step in and take over
/
said contract7 -S° /-<~^ o
/sw, *^, ^
u~~i"
i^ja^r****"
' t~K^s

FHisasinr #

••THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEC* COMPETENT AOVICE

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, m o d e In the Cily of - 5 . L J 5 5 5 t S ? .

™

A

, Slole of Utoh on the _ . . ? " ? .

doy of

eH2uw^

he*relrio"nerTiTerred *io os~ihe" o t s ^ ^

P.£l

84760

hereinofler referred lo 01 the assignee!,

WITNESSETH!
WHEREAS, under dole of ...?£«!?...?.?•
L.fSQn..5P.roy.?.B....

#

«gB5

..

. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ot sellers, entered Into o Uniform Real Ettole Contract wllh

v

Ar Jen W. Jager

_

_

a t buyers, of W a s h i n g t o n , Utoh, which conlroct It delivered herewith, wherein ond whereby the sold tellers
ogreed lo telt a n d the told buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, ond provisions therein set
forth, oil that certain land, w i t h the buildings ond Improvements thereon, erected, tituote. tying ond being In
the County of W a s h i n g t o n

See

#

State of U t a h , and more particularly described as follows 1

attached Schedule A.....

Whereas the 5eiler has conveyed to Intertwest Commercial Properties a security
Interest of $25,000 as set forth In the attached note agreement dated April 1,
1985.
Further the undersigned owner of lnterwest Commercial Properties, Wei
Watson does assign and transfer all interest in said note to Artie Edmunds of
St. George Utah.

to which ogreement

In w r i t i n g , reference It hereby mode for olt of the terms, conditions ond

provisions

thereof* a n d
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors oil of the right, title ond Interest of the
ossignort In talc! property above described ot evidenced by sold written ooreement.
. N O W , THEREFORE, tl is hereby mutually agreed as follows.
1.

That the assignors In consideration of the Payment

of

Ten'Dollars

ond other

good and

valuable

consideration, the receipt of which It hereby acknowledged, assign to 4he assignees, alt their right, title ond
Interetl in ond lo toid above described
of . . . . . A p r i l
3.

1

properly ot evidenced by ibe oforesotd

1 9 . 8 5 . . . concerning (he above described properly.

kWs*axFfo«>ix£*k><r>6oatoo*k
Security

note

That to Induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money a n d to occept the sold contract, ond the

rights obligation pursuant thereto the ossignort hereby represent to the assignees as follows:
a. That the assignors hove duly performed all the conditions of the sold contract.
b. That the contract It n o w In full force and effect ond lhat the unpaid balance of said contract is
$..?5j.OOO

with Interest p a i d lo the

!?.£..•

doy of . . . A p i i i .

_

19.?.$....

C. T h o t ' t o i d conlroct Is assignable.
3.

That In consideration of ihe assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove*

nant with the assignors as follows!
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe a n d perform oil of the terms, conditions ond provisions
of the Said agreement

that ore to be k e p i , observed ond performed by the assignors.

b. That the assignees will save a n d hold harmless the ossignort of ond from any ond oil actions, suits,
costs, domoges, claims a n d demands Whatsoever arising by reason of an oct or omission of the
assignees.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands ond seals the day and
Irst o b o v t

written.

UDutL

WtiL^-

.

CJL*A*AJKI~

,

+$Gf>/u °m cS 5 \ h*~> PCX/Hen X±~- - C-K&CY
JourAtay

year

APPENDIX "H"
Transcript of testimony on attorney fees (pages 162-64)

162
attorney's

fees.

THE COURT:

Do you want t o c r o s s Mr. Miles on

a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , Mr. Huntsman?
MR. HUNTSMAN:
to the reasonableness.

Maybe we can reach a s t i p u l a t i o n as
Obviously I'm going t o o b j e c t

if

I 'm o b l i g a t e d —
THE COURT:

Do you know what h e ' s going t o

MR. MILES:

Should I make a p r o f f e r ?

testify

to?

MR. HUNTSMAN:

Make a p r o f f e r .

THE COURT:

All r i g h t .

MR. MILES:

Your Honor, I t e s t i f y t h a t on t h i s

l a w s u i t , I have s p e n t a t l e a s t 150 hours of t i m e .

I say

" a t l e a s t " because I h a v e n ' t k e p t e x a c t r e c o r d s .

I began

t o keep some r e c o r d s when we g o t i n t o t h e l a w s u i t and t h e
Court was asking q u e s t i o n s about my a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s on an
hourly b a s i s .

Because my agreement with Mr. Edmunds was

on a c o n t i n g e n c y ; s o , I d i d n ' t s e e t h e need t o keep
records.
But I did keep r e c o r d s , and I know t h a t
s p e n t a t l e a s t 150 hours on t h i s c a s e .

And my h o u r l y

I've
fee

i s $60 an hour, and t h a t would come t o $9,000 on
attorney's

fees.
Now, I need t o q u a l i f y t h a t a l i t t l e

bit

b e c a u s e t h i s c a s e has been c o m p l i c a t e d , and t h e r e ' s been

163
1

several issues.

2

t o recover the commission.

3

today, but not a l l of my time was spent on t h a t p a r t of

4

it.

5

This case has not a l l been about the s u i t
T h a t ' s what we're trying

So to help the Court and counsel the best I

6

couldf I would have to say that in defending the

7

counterclaim that was brought by Mr. Jager and for

8

misrepresentation on the part of both Mr. Sprouse and

9

Mr. Edmunds, I probably spent at least a third of my time

10

on defending that counterclaim/ and probably another third

11

of my time was involved in trying to assert our rights to

12

participate in a foreclosure and in working through the

13

foreclosure with Mr. Pendleton and the arguments and

14

hearings we had on that part of it.

15

actually, of my time has been trying to collect the note.

16
17

THE COURT:

So about a third,

So you're testifying your fees that

you're asking for today are $3,000?

18

MR. MILES:

19

include the whole case.

20

not all of it was on the note.

21

that I can only recover on the note, then it would be

22

3,000.

23

I'm asking for 9,000, but that would
But I need to tell the Court that
And if the Court finds

THE COURT: Mr. Huntsman, do you accept that

24

proffer, that that's what he would testify if he were

25

called and sworn?
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1
2

MR. HUNTSMAN:
to, yes, sir.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HUNTSMAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

That thatfs what he would testify

Do you wish to cross-examine?
No, Your Honor.

All right.

We'll accept the p r o f f e r ,

then.

7

Anything else, Mr. Miles?

8

MR. MILES:

No. We rest at this point, Your Honor

9

THE COURT:

All right.

10
11
12
13

MR. HUNTSMAN:

The defense?

I'd like to call Leon Sprouse, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Sprouse, come forward

and face the clerk and raise your right hand, please.

14
15

ELMER LEON SPROUSE,

16

the witness herein, having been

17

first duly sworn, was examined

18

and testified as follows:

19
20

DIRECT EXAMINATION

21

BY MR. HUNTSMAN:

22

Q.

State your full name for the record, please.

23

A.

Elmer Leon Sprouse.

24

Q.

Where do you live, Mr. Sprouse?

25

A.

6291 South Pecos Road, Las Vegas, Nevada.

